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Abstract—Preferential attachment models have been widely
studied in complex networks, because they can explain the
formation of many networks like social networks, citation
networks, power grids, and biological networks, to name a few.
Motivated by the application of key predistribution in wireless
sensor networks (WSN), we initiate the study of preferential
attachment with degree bound.
Our paper has two important contributions to two different
areas. The first is a contribution in the study of complex
networks. We propose preferential attachment model with
degree bound for the first time. In the normal preferential
attachment model, the degree distribution follows a power law,
with many nodes of low degree and a few nodes of high degree.
In our scheme, the nodes can have a maximum degree dmax,
where dmax is an integer chosen according to the application.
The second is in the security of wireless sensor networks.
We propose a new key predistribution scheme based on the
above model. The important features of this model are that the
network is fully connected, it has fewer keys, has larger size of
the giant component and lower average path length compared
with traditional key predistribution schemes and comparable
resilience to random node attacks.
We argue that in many networks like key predistribution
and Internet of Things, having nodes of very high degree will
be a bottle-neck in communication. Thus, studying preferential
attachment model with degree bound will open up new direc-
tions in the study of complex networks, and will have many
applications in real world scenarios.
Keywords: Complex Networks, Preferential Attachment,
Key Predistribution, Degree Distribution, Giant Component.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) consists of a network of devices
which communicate with each other exchanging data and
control information. IoT appears in many areas like smart
homes, smart cities, smart grids, vehicular networks, peer-to-
peer (P2P) networks, agriculture, health-care, to name only
a few. Devices can be of many types and might be resource
constrained. Since the devices exchange large volumes of
data, communication and storage overheads should be mini-
mized.
IoT can be represented by a graph, with devices being
represented as nodes and communication links as edges. P2P
networks [13], sensor networks [8], smart grids [9], [18],
Bluetooth networks [24] have all been modeled as random
graphs and have been well studied.
IoT might consist of Wireless Sensor Networks that are
widely used in many civilian, commercial, and military ap-
plications. Some of these networks are vulnerable to attacks,
particularly those in the military domain [14]. The resource
constrained nature of sensors restricts the use of public key
methods to secure communication. Key predistribution [7]
is a widely used symmetric key management technique in
which cryptographic keys are preloaded in sensor networks
prior to deployment. Sensor nodes find out the common keys
using a shared key discovery phase. Messages are encrypted
by the source node using the shared key and decrypted at the
receiving node using the same key.
The number of keys in each node is to be minimized, in
order to reduce storage space. Direct communication between
any pair of nodes help in quick and easy transmission of
message. As mentioned in [22], transmission and reception
requires more power than computing. So, the number of
hops between nodes should be minimized. Intermediate nodes
might leak information and nodes are prone to capture or
compromise.
Many key predistribution techniques have been proposed
that trade-off storage, computation, communication and re-
silience. Some of these techniques are random ( [4], [7]) and
some are deterministic [3], [11], [19]. The deterministic tech-
niques often do not scale well and have poor resilience when
a large number of nodes are compromised. The randomized
techniques are simple to implement and are highly resilient.
In [7], a large key pool or a set of keys is constructed. A fixed
number of k keys are drawn at random without replacement
from this key pool. In [4], a node chooses k other nodes at
random and communicates with them using unique pairwise
keys.
There has been research on the structure of networks,
where random key predistribution have been applied. Given
such predistribution schemes, a key graph is constructed in
the following way. The set of vertices is the set of nodes in
the network. An edge exists between two vertices if they are
within communication range and share a common key. It has
been shown that the key graph arising from [7] is an Erdos-
Renyi random graph with parameters p = lnn+cn (c is a real
constant), whereas the key graph of [4] is a k-out graph.
Erdos-Renyi (ER) graphs are random graphs often denoted
by G(n, p), where n is the number of nodes and p is the
probability that there exists an edge between two vertices. A
k-out graph is a random graph in which every vertex has an
outdegree k, where the k vertices are chosen uniformly at
random from the set of all vertices. Key graphs have been
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2studied in [2], [15], [28].
The theory of random graphs is a widely studied topic
and many results are known. These results can be used to in-
crease fault tolerance and connectivity, and decrease storage
costs and communication costs of a random predistribution
scheme.
It can be seen that the degree of the node signifies the
number of nodes which share keys with this node, and which
are within its communication range. To ensure that the time
taken to transmit a message between any two nodes is low,
the diameter and average path length of the graph should be
low. Another important aspect is the connectivity of nodes
during node compromise. In a network, there can be either
node failure or communication link failure. How does the rest
of the network behave? There are many interesting questions
to answer while studying the fault tolerance or resilience of
networks. One commonly used metric in key predistribution
is the fraction of edges that are disconnected or the number
of nodes that are isolated due to the compromise of a certain
number of nodes. However, it does not entirely capture the
notion of resilience. This is because, there might be a few
components which are fully connected, thereby decreasing
the fraction of edges disconnected. However, such a network
is not fault-tolerant. A giant component in a random graph
contains a constant fraction of the total number of vertices of
the graph. The size of the giant component is often a measure
of resilience of a random graph. To ensure that messages are
transmitted efficiently, it is important to study the average
path length and diameter of a graph.
Keeping in mind the requirements of sensor networks, we
propose a new model of key predistribution, which is based
on the preferential attachment model. Preferential attachment
(PA) model has its roots in Herbert Simon’s 1955 paper
[23]. The model was analyzed by Albert Barabasi and Reka
Albert in [1]. The basic idea is to grow the network in
such a way that the overall global effect is the same. In
the basic model, at each time step, a node is added and an
edge is added to another node with a probability proportional
to its degree. The degree distribution follows a power law,
meaning that the probability that a node has degree k is
proportional to k−α, where α ≥ 2 is a constant. The plot
of the degree distribution has a long tail. There are a few
nodes of very high degree and many nodes of low degree.
In this way, a rich (high degree) node gets richer (more
links). This phenomenon is often called the rich get richer
effect. Preferential attachment is widely observed in many
real networks like social networks, citation networks, power
grids, biological networks, and many more. The diameter of
such graphs is O(log log n), where n is the number of nodes.
This is in contrast to ER random graphs whose diameter is
O(log n).
Consider the following generative model for key predistri-
bution. For each node v, we choose k nodes following the
preferential attachment model. A unique key is chosen for
each of these k nodes. Node v shares a unique key with
each of these k nodes. In this way, nodes are assigned keys
in such a manner that if there is a link between two nodes in
the graph, then there is a unique common key between the
nodes. We assume full visibility, meaning that every node is
within communication range of every other node.
On the positive side, the networks are connected and have
small average path length and small diameter, meaning that
any two nodes can communicate using only a small number
of hops. In [7], average path length and diameter can be
very long. In [7], the graph might not even be connected.
However, in our scheme a few nodes will have very high
degree, which means that the storage cost is substantially
high for these nodes. In order to address this problem,
we propose the preferential attachment model with degree
bound (PA-DB), in which edges are joined to a node with
probability proportional to the degree of vertices, with an
added restriction. A bound dmax is fixed on the maximum
degree that the graph can have. For every new node, a node is
selected with probability proportional to the degree of those
nodes, which have degree at most dmax − 1. This ensures
that a node can have degree at most dmax. This overcomes
the problem of high storage cost for some nodes.
Restricting the maximum degree of a graph is an im-
portant requirement in many applications. In peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks, each node is a computer with limited system
resources. Each new connection requires resources like CPU
cycle, memory, disk space and network bandwidth. Hence, it
is necessary to limit the number of connections that a node
has to maintain, which effectively bounds the node’s degree.
An application in computing the streaming capacity in P2P
networks is given in [12].
We study the following properties of this PA-DB graph:
degree distribution, diameter and average path length. We
also study fault-tolerance aspects such as the size of the giant
component, when a few nodes fail. The construction when
applied to predistribution results in storage and communica-
tion efficient schemes. Added to this, there are no shared key
discovery phase, because each node knows its neighbor and
the common key.
This problem opens up a new direction of research. At a
theoretical level, estimating different parameters of the PA-
DB network is a challenging task. There are many models for
growing graphs under preferential attachment. So, it is inter-
esting to see how this PA-DB model behaves. On a practical
side, since networks in real life like social networks, sensor
networks and power grids follow power law distribution, this
type of key predistribution can be used in such networks. In
most cases like power grids, the capacity of a hub is limited,
so preferential attachment with degree bound makes more
sense than normal preferential attachment.
A. Our Contributions
1) We initiate the study of preferential attachment with
degree bound, in which nodes can have degree at
most dmax, where dmax is chosen depending upon the
3application.
2) We empirically study different parameters of the net-
work formed by this model. In particular, we study
the degree distribution, average path length, number of
isolated nodes, number of edges removed, and size of
the giant component.
3) A new key predistribution scheme is proposed using
the above model.
4) The predistribution scheme results in low storage and
communication costs, low average path length, and
high resilience compared to existing predistribution
schemes.
5) We open a new direction of research and pose many
open problems.
B. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
present related works for key predistribution. Mathematical
background on preferential attachment is presented in Section
III. Our model and its analysis are presented in Section IV. In
Section V, we study the predistribution scheme and compare
it with existing schemes. We conclude in Section VI with
future direction of research and some open problems.
II. RELATED WORK
Key predistribution (KPD) in WSN was first proposed by
Eschenaur and Gligor (EG) [7] as a practical lightweight
alternative of key management in resource constrained sen-
sors. As discussed in the introduction, their scheme was
probabilistic in nature, and did not guarantee connectivity
of the network. Finding common key is also difficult and
required communication overhead of O(k log n), as shown in
[20]. Chan, Perrig and Song (CPS) [4] proposed a pairwise
scheme, in which each node shares a unique common key
with at least k nodes selected at random. This ensures full
resilience, meaning that even if some nodes are compromised,
the rest of the key sharing links remain unaffected. On the flip
side, some nodes can have arbitrarily large number of keys
and some nodes will have few keys. There is no guarantee
that the network will be connected.
Thereafter, many key predistribution schemes have been
proposed, which trade-off storage with resilience and connec-
tivity. Combinatorial schemes like [3], [10], [19] are a class
of deterministic schemes which were very popular because of
their simplicity of construction and simple algorithms to find
key sharing neighbors. However, such schemes do not scale
well and have poor resilience. Camtepe and Yener [3] were
the first to propose such schemes using combinatorial designs
called projective planes. Lee and Stinson [10] proposed
KPD schemes using transversal designs, while Ruj and Roy
[19], [21] used partially balanced incomplete block designs
and Reed-Solomon codes. In Section V, we will show that
the Lee-Stinson (LS) scheme [10] has very poor resilience
compared to random key predistribution schemes. A survey
of such schemes appear in [16], [25].
Most of these schemes studied the fraction of links com-
promised and number of nodes isolated under node compro-
mise. However, these are not the only measures of resilience.
Pietro et al. [15] showed that connectivity via secure links
and resilience against malicious attacks can be achieved
simultaneously in random EG scheme. They showed that an
adversary cannot partition the network into two components
of linear size, unless they compromise linearly many nodes.
These networks are unsplittable with high probability, and
redoubtable, meaning that even by compromising a large
number of nodes, the confidentiality is not lost.
Blackburn and Gerke [2] studied uniform random inter-
section graphs. The problem is to attach a list of k colors to
each of n nodes, the colors being chosen uniformly at random
from a set of m colors, such that two nodes are connected
if they have a common color in their list. It can be seen that
EG network is an example of these types of graphs. They
analyzed the connectivity of such graphs.
Yagan et al [26]–[28] studied the key graphs formed by
[7] and [4] under full and partial visibility. They showed that
graphs defined in [4] are connected with high probability.
They also studied the security under the ON-OFF secure
channel, which means that the links between nodes might
or might not be active at a given instant.
III. BACKGROUND
Preferential attachment (PA) is a well studied model for
generating random graphs. The main idea behind preferential
attachment is that, at each step a new node is added with
an edge with the other end point chosen from the set of
existing nodes with a probability proportional to the degree
of the node. This implies that a high degree node has a higher
chance of being chosen. There are a large number of nodes
with low degree and a few nodes (also called hubs) with
very high degree. The degree distribution of the nodes follow
a power law, meaning that the probability that a node has
degree k is given by P (k) ∝ k−α, where α ≥ 2 is a constant.
The plot of P (k) against k gives a curve with a long tail.
These graphs are known to possess a scale free property,
meaning that the degree distribution of nodes still follow a
power law with the same coefficient α, even when sampling
at different time intervals. In other words, if instead of one
edge k edges are selected with probability proportional to the
degree, the same degree distribution is obtained.
Scale-free networks are popular because they occur in
many real life situations. For example, in a social network,
a person who is already popular has a higher probability
of acquiring new friends. Scale-free networks also occur in
citation networks, power grids, biological networks and many
others.
These are the parameters for the PA model [5]:
1) Number of nodes n in the final graph G,
2) A probability p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
3) An initial graph G0 at time t = 0.
Generally, we take G0 to be a single vertex with a self loop.
4The random graph Gt(p,G0) is constructed as defined
below:
1) Begin with the initial graph G0.
2) At time t > 0, the graph Gt is formed from Gt−1 as
follows:
a) With probability p, choose a vertex v ∈ V (Gt−1)
uniformly at random.
b) With probability 1 − p, choose a vertex v ∈
V (Gt−1) randomly with probability proportional
to its degree deg(v).
The degree distribution for the random graph Gt follows a
power law. The probability that a node has degree k is given
by P (k) ∝ k−α, where, α = 1+ 11−p . Since
∑∞
k=1 P (k) = 1,
P (k) = 1ζ(α)k
−α, where ζ(t) is the Riemann zeta function,
and is given by ζ(t) =
∑∞
k=1 k
−t. For detailed study of the
model, one can refer to [5], [6].
Algorithm 1 PA−DB(G0, n, p, dmax, k)
1: V (G0)← {v0, . . . , vk−1};
2: E(G0)← {(v0, v0), . . . , (vk−1, vk−1)};
3: for t = k, . . . , n− 1 do
4: Create a new vertex vt;
5: Choose r uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1];
6: if r ≤ p then
7: Choose k distinct nodes (without replacement)
{u1, . . . , uk} uniformly at random from those ver-
tices in V (Gt−1) whose degree is at most dmax−1;
8: else
9: Choose k distinct nodes (without replacement)
{u1, . . . , uk} with probability proportional to
deg(ui), 1 ≤ i ≤ k from those vertices in V (Gt−1)
whose degree is at most dmax − 1;
10: end if
11: V (Gt) = V (Gt−1) ∪ {vt};
12: E(Gt) = E(Gt−1) ∪ {(vt, u1), . . . , (vt, uk)};
13: end for
14: return Gn−1;
IV. PROPOSED MODEL OF PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT
WITH DEGREE BOUND
We first present Algorithm 1 for preferential attachment
with degree bound, and then show how it compares with the
traditional preferential attachment model. The initial graph
G0 consists of k isolated nodes v0, . . . , vk−1 and each node
vi has a self-loop (vi, vi).
The parameters to be considered are:
1) An initial graph G0 at time t = 0,
2) Number of nodes n in the final graph G,
3) A probability p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
4) A degree bound dmax.
5) Number of neighbors (edges) k added to a new node.
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Fig. 1. Degree Distribution for PA with and without degree bound
In Algorithm 1 for preferential attachment with degree
bound, instead of connecting every new vertex to only one
existing vertex, it is being connected to k other vertices. This
results in a graph with degree at least k. Such graphs will be
used in our predistribution scheme in Section V.
We consider graphs on n = 1000 vertices with p = 0.4
and k = 4 edges attached to every new vertex at each step.
Therefore α = 1 + 11−p = 2.67 for the PA model. The
following graphs are compared in Fig. 1:
1) Normal PA model.
2) PA with degree bound dmax = 15, 20, 25, 30.
For the PA-DB model, the number of nodes with degree
equal to dmax is significantly higher than nodes of degrees
dmax − 1, dmax − 2, . . .. One reason is that the nodes which
could have degree greater than dmax now have a degree of
dmax.
We compare the average path length and the diameter of
the graphs in Table I. The average path length is slightly
longer for PA-DB than PA. For a network with 1000 nodes,
k = 4, degree bound 15, and p = 0.4, the average path
length is 3.70 and the diameter is 7. Without degree bound,
the average path length is 3.36 and the diameter is 5.
V. NEW KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEME USING PA-DB
We show how to use preferential attachment with degree
bound for key predistribution. Let G(n, p) be a graph ob-
tained by executing Algorithm 1 given in Section IV. Observe
that at each step, a new vertex is connected to k other vertices.
Thus, each node has at least k edges incident to it. For
simplicity, we refer to the graph as G. Each vertex in G
corresponds to a node in the network. The set of neighbors
of a vertex v ∈ V (G) is denoted by nbd(v). For each sensor
node v, we assign |nbd(v)| unique pairwise keys, one for
each u ∈ nbd(v). The closest model is [4], where each node
selects k nodes at random and share a unique pairwise key
with each of the k nodes.
A node v thus maintains the identity of its neighbors and
the unique common key shared with each of the neighbors.
The degree bound ensures that each node stores at most dmax
5TABLE I
AVERAGE PATH LENGTH AND DIAMETER OF GRAPHS GENERATED USING PA AND PA-DB MODELS
Metric PA PA-DB
dmax = 15 dmax = 20 dmax = 25 dmax = 30
Average path length 3.36 3.70 3.61 3.55 3.46
Diameter 5 7 6 6 6
keys. The high degree nodes can be considered as cluster
heads in a hierarchical network.
We now check the various properties of this key predistri-
bution scheme.
1) There is a vertex for each sensor node in the network.
Thus there are n nodes in the network.
2) The degree bound ensures that each node stores at most
dmax keys.
3) The network is fully connected when no nodes are
compromised (by the construction of the graph).
4) The diameter of the graph is O(log log n). This means
that the number of message transmission is small,
compared to the size of the network.
5) Since a node shares pairwise keys with other nodes
to which it is connected, it is fully resilient to node
compromise. This means, that apart from the nodes that
are compromised, no other links between the existing
nodes are broken.
We now consider the effect of node compromise on a
wireless sensor network (WSN).
A. Adversarial model
The adversarial models generally considered in WSN are
random node compromise and targeted node compromise.
When a node is compromised, an adversary can read all
the information stored in the node, including the data and
the keys. The main problem is how to prevent the adversary
to receive any information about the data or keys stored in
other nodes. In most key predistribution schemes, the set
of keys belonging to the non compromised nodes can be
calculated. In the scheme given in [7], the nodes exchange
the identifiers of the keys, so a passive adversary knows
which key identifiers are present in which node. Thus, an
adversary can selectively compromise nodes, such that the
size of the set of keys compromised is maximized. One way
of doing this, is to select nodes, which have disjoint set
of key identifiers or nodes where the set of common key
identifiers is few. In most of the combinatorial schemes, the
nodes exchange the identities of the nodes, and calculate the
common key identifiers. Since the key identifier algorithm is
known publicly, an adversary knows which node has what
set of keys, though nodes do not exchange them explicitly.
Thus, selective node compromise is possible in this case as
well.
In our proposed model, a node only shares unique common
keys with a set of nodes. Only if an attacker compromises
a node, does it know which node contains what common
keys with which other nodes. The key distribution algorithm
speaks nothing about the assignment of keys to nodes.
This is because, a node only know its neighbors and the
common keys. Even if the key generation algorithm above is
made public, the node identifiers might not be sequentially
assigned.
When nodes are deployed in the field, the structure of all
the nodes are similar. Messages are sent intermittently, so
it is not easy to do a traffic analysis and find out a high
degree or high betweenness node (betweenness of a node
is the number of shortest paths through that node). Thus,
selective node compromise by capturing high degree nodes
or high betweenness nodes do not arise for this application.
B. Resilience under node compromise
We consider only random node compromise. An adversary
can select and compromise s nodes at random. We denote
the fraction of nodes compromised by fs. Thus fs = s/n.
We study the resilience of the network by comparing the
following parameters:
1) Fraction of nodes isolated when s nodes are compro-
mised. We denote this metric by V (s).
2) Fraction of edges removed when s nodes are compro-
mised. We denote this metric by E(s).
3) The size of the largest component. We denote the
fraction of nodes in the largest component by C(s).
4) The average path length P (s) in the resulting graph
after s nodes are compromised.
The first two measures have been widely used in the
literature [16], [17], [19]. We propose the third and the
fourth measures, because they capture fault tolerance quite
well. For example, there might be a few components each
forming a clique, thereby increasing the number of edges
in the resulting graph. According to the previous measures,
although the graph might look to be highly resilient, in reality
it is not.
C. Experimental setup
We now discuss each of the metrics in details and show
how our results compare with that of existing schemes. There
are 10000 nodes in each network. The nodes are deployed
randomly.
We compare our scheme with that of:
1) Eschenaur and Gligor (EG) scheme [7].
2) CPS scheme [4], which gives a k-out graph.
3) Combinatorial scheme of Lee and Stinson (LS) [10].
4) Combinatorial scheme of Ruj et al. (RNS) [17].
For CPS scheme, we choose k = 7. We observe that
maximum degree of a node is 25. For EG scheme, we choose
6the size of key chain as 25 and a key pool of 500000
keys. We choose LS and RNS scheme with k = 25. For
our scheme, we choose dmax = 25. There are many other
schemes present in the literature. For example, there are many
deterministic schemes. However, we do not consider all of
them, because deterministic schemes perform poorly as the
number of compromised nodes increases. The specific pattern
also limits the scalability of the networks.
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D. Fraction of nodes isolated
We define V (s) to be the ratio of the number of nodes
isolated and the total number of nodes in the network. We
compare the V (s) values in Fig 2, when a constant fraction
of nodes are compromised. Our scheme performs best among
the four schemes. The LS scheme performs worst, followed
by the RNS scheme, EG scheme and the CPS scheme.
E. Fraction of edges removed
The total number of edges removed is bounded by the
number of edges that are incident on the compromised nodes.
If we consider the sum of the degrees of all the compromised
nodes, each removed edge is counted either once or twice. It
is counted twice, if both the end points are compromised and
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once if only one end point is compromised. Our scheme is
fully secure, meaning that when s nodes are compromised,
none of the edges between any two uncompromised nodes
are broken. This feature is also available in CPS scheme.
In Fig 3, we compare our scheme with that of LS, EG and
CPS. We note that our scheme has the lowest value of E(s).
CPS and EG has comparable but higher E(s), whereas LS
and RNS have the worst E(s) ≈ 1.
F. Fraction of nodes in the largest component
We look at the graph formed by the key predistribution
scheme. When nodes are compromised, nodes and edges
will be broken. Thus, the graph can disintegrate into many
components. From our experiments, we observe that the
network of LS scheme disintegrates into many components,
followed by EG and CPS. In our scheme there are very
few components, and it has been seen that most of these
components consist of isolated vertices. From Fig. 4, the
size of the largest component is highest in our scheme and
almost 0 in case of LS and RNS. This means that the graph
disintegrates into small components and there are no giant
components in LS. The values of C(s) for the CPS and the
EG schemes lie in between.
7G. Average path length
We have compared the path lengths of various schemes in
Fig. 5. The average path length is smallest in our scheme.
The corresponding value for CPS is larger and that in EG
the largest. Thus, in our scheme, messages can be trans-
mitted quickly from one node to other nodes. We have not
considered the LS and RNS schemes, because the graph
disintegrates when nodes are compromised.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have proposed a new model of preferential attachment.
Here the maximum degree is upper bounded by dmax. The
new model is applied to key predistribution in wireless sensor
networks and it is found to be better than existing key
predistribution schemes. We have seen that PA with degree
bound has applications in many real life scenarios like power
grids, where nodes have limited capacity. We can also think
of the highest degree nodes as cluster heads or hubs. A hub
cannot have a very large degree. We believe that this model
is more suitable for IoT and cyber-physical systems than the
conventional PA model.
There are many interesting open problems. We list a few
of them below.
• Mathematical analysis of this model to find the average
path length, diameter, betweenness, degree distribution,
size of the giant component, clustering coefficient and
other graph parameters.
• What is the effect of the maximum degree bound dmax
on the degree distribution of the graph?
• There are many PA models. It is interesting to see
the effect of degree distribution with respect to these
models.
• Can we vary dmax to make the graph more fault-tolerant
under random attacks?
• In a more realistic scenario, instead of a single degree
bound dmax for all vertices, we have a degree bound dv
for every vertex v. Our model is a special case of this
model. Study of such models is interesting in its own
right.
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